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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this Truth in Lending Act case, we must interpret the 
"no annual fee" provision of a credit card solicitation. 
Months after plaintiff Paula Rossman responded to a 
solicitation offering this term, defendant Fleet Bank 
changed the operable credit agreement and imposed an 
annual fee. Rossman brought this putative class action 
alleging, inter alia, that Fleet violated the TILA by failing to 
disclose the fee later imposed. The District Court dismissed 
plaintiff 's TILA count for failing to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.1 We will reverse and remand. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.), N.A., No. 00-3879, 2000 WL 
33119419 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2000). The District Court had jurisdiction 
over plaintiff 's TILA claim under 28 U.S.C.S 1331. We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1292. Because this is an appeal from the 
granting of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),"[w]e accept all 
factual allegations in the complaints and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. We may 
affirm only if it is certain that no relief could be granted under any set 
of facts which could be proven." Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1411 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
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I. 
 
In late 1999, plaintiff Paula Rossman received a"Pre- 
Qualified Invitation" to obtain a credit card from defendant 
Fleet Bank.2 The solicitation was for a "Fleet Platinum 
MasterCard" with a low annual percentage rate 3 and "no 
annual fee." If interested, the recipient of this offer was to 
check a box next to which was written, "YES! I want the top 
card for genuine value and superior savings, the no- 
annual-fee Platinum MasterCard." An asterisk directed the 
recipient to a note that stated, "See the TERMS OF PRE- 
QUALIFIED OFFER and CONSUMER INFORMATION for 
detailed rate and other information." 
 
The enclosure entitled "Consumer Information" contained 
the "Schumer Box"--the table of basic credit card 
information that is required under the Truth in Lending 
Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1601 et seq., as amended by the Fair 
Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988. Within the 
Schumer Box, there was a column with the heading 
"Annual Fee"; the box beneath that heading contained only 
the word "None." On the "Consumer Information" 
enclosure, but outside the Schumer box, Fleet listed other 
fees. Also in that location was the statement, "We reserve 
the right to change the benefit features associated with 
your Card at any time." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Rossman named four Fleet entities as defendants: Fleet Bank (R.I.) 
National Association, Fleet Credit Card Services, L.P., Fleet Credit Card 
Holdings, Inc., and FleetBoston Financial Corporation. As there are no 
issues in dispute requiring these entities to be differentiated, we will 
refer to them collectively as "Fleet." 
 
3. It appears Rossman may have received two different credit card offers 
from Fleet. The one plaintiff appended to her complaint offered a "2.99% 
fixed APR until May 1, 2000," after which the rate was to rise to a 
"9.99% fixed APR." That offer expired on November 30, 1999. Fleet 
submits, and Rossman has not contested, that she actually responded to 
a second offer, which expired on December 31, 2000. That mailing 
offered a "7.99% fixed APR," which Fleet emphasized was "not an 
introductory rate." As we discuss, the card Rossman ultimately received 
appears to have had a 7.99% APR, suggesting she responded to the 
second solicitation. As both mailings offered a card with "no annual fee" 
--the term at issue in this case--the resolution of this appeal does not 
implicate this ambiguity. 
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Rossman responded to Fleet's offer, and soon thereafter 
received her "no-annual-fee Platinum MasterCard." It is 
unclear from her complaint and the documents in the record4 
exactly when this occurred. It appears, however, that she 
received her card in December of 1999 or January of 2000. 
Along with the card, Rossman was sent Fleet's "Cardholder 
Agreement," which contained the following provision 
concerning annual fees: "No annual membership fee will be 
charged to your Account." 
 
The Agreement provided for various applicable annual 
percentage rates charged on outstanding balances, 
including the standard rate for purchases (7.99%) and 
several higher rates that could be triggered by certain acts 
or omissions on the part of the cardholder. Among these 
was a rate of 24.99% that Fleet was entitled to impose 
"upon any closure of [the] Account." The Agreement also 
contained a change-in-terms provision, which stated: 
 
        We have the right to change any of the terms of this 
       Agreement at any time. You will be given notice of a 
       change as required by applicable law. Any change in 
       terms governs your Account as of the effective date, 
       and will, as permitted by law and at our option, apply 
       both to transactions made on or after such date and to 
       any outstanding Account balance. 
 
In May 2000, Fleet sent a letter to plaintiff announcing 
its intention to change the terms of the agreement. That 
letter read, in part: 
 
        Over the past several months, the Federal Reserve 
       has been steadily raising interest rates, making it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. While this is an appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, certain 
documents may be considered in addition to the complaint itself. 
Exhibits attached to the complaint and upon which one or more claim 
is based are appropriately incorporated into the record for consideration 
of a 12(b)(6) motion. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 340 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1989). Furthermore, "a court may consider an undisputedly authentic 
document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss 
if the plaintiff 's claims are based on the document." Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 
1993). Neither party disputes that the relevant credit card solicitations 
and agreements constitute such documents. 
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       difficult for credit card issuers to maintain products 
       and services at current rates. While many experts 
       predict that the Federal Reserve will continue to raise 
       interest rates, the regular rate for purchases and 
       balance transfers on your Fleet account remains at a 
       fixed 7.99% APR. 
 
        While this rate remains unchanged, a $35 annual 
       membership fee will apply to your account. Effective 
       with billing cycles closing on or after June 1, 2000, the 
       annual fee will appear beginning with your monthly 
       statement that includes the next anniversary date of 
       your account opening. 
 
Soon thereafter, by letter dated June 20, 2000, Fleet 
announced a modification of its original change. Claiming 
the move was necessary in light of still further interest rate 
hikes by the Federal Reserve, Fleet modified the effective 
date of the change. Rather than waiting until the 
anniversary of plaintiff 's account opening, Fleet notified 
Rossman that the annual fee would be imposed almost 
immediately: 
 
        We are modifying the terms of your Fleet Cardholder 
       Agreement only to correct the timing of the annual 
       membership fee previously disclosed. That fee will first 
       be charged to your Account in your billing cycle that 
       closes in July, 2000, and will be charged in that billing 
       cycle each year thereafter. 
 
A thirty-five-dollar fee was charged to Rossman's account 
by July 6, 2000, in accordance with the second letter. 
 
Rossman alleges that despite Fleet's protestations that it 
had been effectively forced to cease offering the card 
without an annual fee, it continued to solicit other new 
customers with offers for no-annual-fee credit cards. Thus, 
she contends, Fleet systematically baited new customers 
with the no-annual-fee offer, while telling its existing 
customers that the fee increase was necessitated by 
changing market conditions. These "no annual fee" offers, 
Rossman alleges, were made by Fleet with the intention of 
imposing a fee shortly thereafter. 
 
Rossman filed this putative class action on behalf of 
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herself and "[a]ll persons who received or will receive an 
offer . . . from Fleet . . . for a no annual fee credit card, and 
who accepted that offer and who were then charged, or 
have been notified they will be charged, an annual fee."5 
She asserts violations of the TILA and Rhode Island law: (1) 
violation of Rhode Island's Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 
R.I. Gen. Laws S 6-13.1-1 et seq.; (2) common law fraud; 
and (3) breach of contract. The essence of plaintiff 's TILA 
claim is that the original solicitations, insofar as they 
described the credit card as one with no annual fee, 
violated the TILA's requirement of accurate disclosure. 
 
Fleet moved to dismiss the TILA count, contending 
Rossman failed to state a proper claim. Granting the 
motion to dismiss, the District Court held Rossman's 
allegations did not state a deficiency in the original 
disclosures sufficient to constitute a violation under the 
TILA. Declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
the state law claims, the District Court dismissed the suit. 
Rossman appealed. 
 
II. 
 
The stated purpose of the Truth in Lending Act, which 
took effect in 1969, is "to assure a meaningful disclosure of 
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare 
more readily the various credit terms available to him and 
avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the 
consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and 
credit card practices." 15 U.S.C. S 1601. In pursuit of these 
aims, the statute requires a series of disclosures that must 
be made before the consummation (the point at which legal 
obligations attach) of the underlying credit agreement, as 
well as at certain other specified times. 
 
Congress included in the Act a provision expressly 
authorizing the Federal Reserve Board to "prescribe 
regulations to carry out the purposes of " the TILA. 15 
U.S.C. S 1604. The Board promulgated "Regulation Z," 12 
C.F.R. S 226, for this purpose. It also published extensive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court dismissed the case before considering class 
certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
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"Official Staff Interpretations." 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226 Supp. I. 
"[T]he Supreme Court has emphasized the broad powers 
that Congress delegated to the Board to fill gaps in the 
statute" with these two devices. Ortiz v. Rental Mgmt., Inc., 
65 F.3d 335, 339 (3d Cir. 1995). "Unless demonstrably 
irrational, Federal Reserve Board staff opinions construing 
the Act or Regulation should be dispositive . . . ." Ford 
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980). 
 
Because the TILA is a remedial consumer protection 
statute, we have held it "should be construed liberally in 
favor of the consumer." Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan 
Corp., 156 F.3d 499, 502 (3d Cir. 1998); accord Begala v. 
PNC Bank, Ohio, N.A., 163 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 1998) 
("We have repeatedly stated that TILA is a remedial statute 
and, therefore, should be given a broad, liberal construction 
in favor of the consumer."); Fairley v. Turan-Foley Imps., 
Inc., 65 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The TILA is to be 
enforced strictly against creditors and construed liberally in 
favor of consumers . . . ."). 
 
In 1988, Congress determined the protections of the TILA 
with respect to credit and charge cards were inadequate to 
ensure sufficiently informed use of these credit devices. 
Congress enacted the "Fair Credit and Charge Card 
Disclosure Act,"6 which substantially strengthened the 
TILA's requirements with respect to credit cards. 
Significantly, for the first time, it imposed disclosure 
requirements on credit card applications and solicitations. 
The TILA now requires applications and solicitations to 
disclose the annual percentage rates, certain fees (including 
annual fees), the grace period for payments, and the 
balance calculation method. 16 U.S.C. S 1637. Before the 
amendment, the TILA required only that issuers make 
these disclosures before the opening of the account--a 
requirement ordinarily fulfilled by providing the disclosures 
along with the card. See S. Rep. No. 100-259, at 3 (1988), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3936, 3938. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. "Charge cards" for these purposes are cards, such as the American 
Express card, that are used to obtain credit, but which do not allow the 
carrying of a balance from one billing cycle to the next. 
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The TILA mandates the required terms be "clearly and 
conspicuously" disclosed. 15 U.S.C. S 1632(a). This 
standard requires the disclosures to be "in a reasonably 
understandable form and readily noticeable to the 
consumer." 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, cmt. 5a(a)(2); cf. 
Applebaum v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 226 F.3d 214, 
220 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying a similar standard in a related 
Consumer Leasing Act case). Certain required terms in 
credit card disclosure statements--including annual fees-- 
must be presented within a simple table--the "Schumer 
Box"--that facilitates easy comparison of credit cards' 
terms. 16 U.S.C. S 1632(c). 
 
The disclosures are intended to make the terms of the 
contractual agreement accessible to the consumer. As 
stated in Regulation Z, "Disclosures shall reflect the terms 
of the legal obligation between the parties." 12 C.F.R. 
S 226.5(c). And "[t]he legal obligation normally is presumed 
to be contained in the contract that evidences the 
agreement." 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, cmt. 5(c). Therefore, 
disclosures should reflect the contractual agreement itself. 
But the mere inclusion of these terms in the agreement is 
ordinarily insufficient to meet the disclosure requirements. 
The purpose of the disclosures is to present the significant 
terms of the agreement to the consumer in a consistent 
manner that is readily seen and easily understood, thereby 
"enabling consumers to shop around for the best cards." S. 
Rep. No. 100-259, at 3, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3938. 
 
The purpose of the TILA is to assure "meaningful" 
disclosures. 15 U.S.C. S 1601. Consequently, the issuer 
must not only disclose the required terms, it must do so 
accurately. The accuracy demanded excludes not only 
literal falsities, but also misleading statements. See 
Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437, 
443 (3d Cir. 1977) (recognizing violation based on 
misleading disclosure); see also Taylor v. Quality Hyundai, 
Inc., 150 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Chapman, 
614 F.2d 968, 977 (5th Cir. 1980) ("A misleading disclosure 
is as much a violation of TILA as a failure to disclose at 
all."). 
 
Furthermore, the accuracy of the representations 
contained in the disclosures is measured at the time those 
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representations are made. "The disclosures should reflect 
the credit terms to which the parties are legally bound at 
the time of giving the disclosures." 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. 
I, cmt. 5(c)(1). And, more particularly, "disclosures in direct 
mail applications and solicitations must be accurate as of 
the time of mailing." 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, cmt. 
5a(c)(1). 
 
Fleet's statement that the card had "no annual fee" was 
lawful, therefore, only if it met two conditions. First, it must 
have disclosed all of the information required by the 
statute. And second, it must have been true--i.e., an 
accurate representation of the legal obligations of the 
parties at that time--when the relevant solicitation was 
mailed. With this background in place, we turn to the 
specifics of this case. 
 
III. 
 
Rossman challenges the adequacy of the disclosures in 
Fleet's credit card solicitation on three related grounds. 
First, she contends the statute requires not only disclosure 
of presently imposed annual fees, but also any annual fee 
that might be imposed in the future. Second, she argues 
whether or not Fleet was required to disclose future fees, its 
disclosures failed to meet the requirements of the TILA 
because they misleadingly suggested there never would be 
an annual fee. Finally, she asserts Fleet used the 
disclosures as part of a bait-and-switch scheme, by which 
it attracted business with the offer for a no-annual-fee card, 
even though it intended to charge an annual fee on the 
card soon thereafter. The first challenge goes to the 
adequacy of Fleet's disclosures; the latter two are more 
naturally understood as directed at their accuracy. 
 
The District Court rejected plaintiff 's arguments by 
interpreting the TILA as requiring the disclosure of only 
annual fees expressly contemplated by the credit agreement 
as it then existed. And since there was not, at either the 
time of the mailing of the solicitation or the opening of 
Rossman's account, an annual fee associated with the card, 
its statement that there was no such fee was accurate7: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The District Court emphasized, however, that the accuracy of the 
statement, for purposes of the TILA, did not imply the alleged scheme 
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"Fleet's disclosures in late 1999 were accurate with respect 
to the terms offered at that time; the fact that Fleet allegedly 
intended to change those terms in the near future did not 
render the disclosures inaccurate for purposes of the TILA." 
Rossman, 2000 WL 33119419, at *3. Consistent with this 
view, Fleet contends it was required to state, in its 
disclosures, that the card had no annual fee, since any 
other statement would fail to accurately reflect the 
underlying agreement, which did not (until modified) permit 
the imposition of such a fee. 
 
Fleet emphasizes that the requirements at issue here are 
disclosure requirements. As noted, the disclosures are 
intended to alert the consumer to the applicable terms of 
the credit agreement. If there is unlawful manipulation of 
the underlying terms, that is governed by the substantive 
law applicable to these agreements. The requirements of the 
TILA are violated, however, only if the substance of the 
agreement is not properly disclosed at each point. Fleet 
maintains that, assuming the facts as alleged by Rossman, 
the manipulation of the agreements may be wrongful, but 
the disclosures were accurate reflections of the substance 
of the agreements at the relevant times, which is all the 
TILA requires. 
 
Under Fleet's view, it was not required to disclose the 
annual fee because it did not specify such a fee in the 
agreement it drafted. That it did not include the term in the 
agreement was no significant impediment to its imposing 
the fee because it was able to invoke the change-in-terms 
provision of the agreement, a provision not itself required to 
be disclosed. Thus, Fleet contends it was not barred from 
imposing an annual fee, but did not have to disclose that 
fact in advance. In essence, then, the interpretation of the 
TILA urged by Fleet--and adopted by the District Court-- 
would permit Fleet to effectively avoid its disclosure 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
was an acceptable course of conduct: "If, as alleged, Fleet lured 
consumers into opening credit card accounts with relatively favorable 
terms while intending to switch those terms shortly thereafter, then Fleet 
unquestionably engaged in wrongdoing." Rossman, 2000 WL 33119419, 
at *3. 
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obligations by strategic use of a change-in-terms provision. 
The question is whether the statute permits such a 
circumvention of its disclosure requirements. 
 
IV. 
 
a. Periodic Fee Disclosure Requirements. 
 
Contending the District Court misinterpreted the TILA 
with respect to the specific disclosure requirements 
applicable to periodic fees, Rossman challenges its ruling 
the TILA requires only disclosures of "presently imposed" 
fees. The Act requires the disclosure of "[a]ny annual fee, 
other periodic fee, or membership fee imposed for the 
issuance or availability of a credit card." 15 U.S.C. 
S 1637(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I). Regulation Z contains similar--but 
importantly different--language, requiring disclosure of 
"[a]ny annual or other periodic fee . . . that may be imposed 
for the issuance or availability of a credit or charge card." 
12 C.F.R. S 226.5a(b)(2) (emphasis added). Fleet was 
therefore required to provide clear, conspicuous, and 
accurate notice of the parties' legal obligations with respect 
to any such fee "that may be imposed for the issuance or 
availability" of the Fleet Platinum MasterCard. 
 
Rossman contends the language requiring disclosure of 
any annual fee "that may be imposed" refers to all fees that 
might ever be imposed. According to Rossman, if Fleet 
reserves the power to impose fees in the future, as it has, 
it must disclose all fees it may later impose--including, of 
course, the thirty-five-dollar annual fee it subsequently 
imposed. 
 
We decline to read the annual-fee disclosure requirement 
so broadly. The TILA, as interpreted and implemented by 
the Federal Reserve Board, permits subsequent changes 
that do not affect the accuracy of a previous disclosure. 
E.g., 12 C.F.R. S 226.9(c) ("Whenever any term required to 
be disclosed under S 226.6 is changed or the required 
minimum periodic payment is increased, the creditor shall 
mail or deliver written notice of the change to each 
consumer who may be affected."); cf. 15 U.S.C. S 1634 ("If 
information disclosed in accordance with this part is 
 
                                11 
  
subsequently rendered inaccurate as the result of any act, 
occurrence, or agreement subsequent to the delivery of the 
required disclosures, the inaccuracy resulting therefrom 
does not constitute a violation of this part."); 12 C.F.R. 
S 226.5(e) ("If a disclosure becomes inaccurate because of 
an event that occurs after the creditor mails or delivers the 
disclosures, the resulting inaccuracy is not a violation of 
this regulation, although new disclosures may be required 
under S 226.9(c)."). It is implicit in these provisions that: (1) 
ordinarily, a future change in terms need not be anticipated 
in disclosures; and (2) a failure to disclose does not 
necessarily foreclose the possibility of such a future 
change. Rossman's interpretation cannot be squared with 
this framework. 
 
Furthermore, as the District Court correctly noted, the 
Federal Reserve Board's use of the word "may" does not 
compel adoption of plaintiff 's interpretation. The phrase 
"may impose" means "is permitted to impose" in this 
context, and not, as suggested by plaintiff, "might impose." 
Thus, the issuer is required to disclose any fees it is 
permitted to impose under the applicable agreement. The 
permissive sense of "may" is more congruous with the 
structure of the TILA as a whole. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that credit card issuers need not 
disclose all periodic fees not contemplated by the applicable 
agreement. Absent a separate basis for requiring the 
disclosure of the presently disputed fee, therefore, Fleet 
need not have disclosed it. 
 
b. Duration. 
 
As noted, the TILA prohibits not only failures to disclose, 
but also false or misleading disclosures. Regardless of 
Fleet's disclosure obligations, it was not permitted to 
mislead the recipients of its credit card solicitations into 
believing that Fleet could not or would not impose such a 
fee. Rossman asserts Fleet's disclosures were inaccurate 
and misleading, and hence, violated the TILA's disclosure 
requirements. 
 
Rossman contends the statement "no annual fee" 
contains no temporal limitation; it means "no  annual fee 
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(ever)." This message is strengthened, Rossman argues, by 
Fleet's advertising the absence of an annual fee as a 
defining feature of the card. The solicitation plainly 
described the card as "the no-annual-fee Platinum 
MasterCard." Under Rossman's view, the disclosures 
themselves implied that Fleet was indefinitely committed to 
providing the card free of an annual fee. Because under the 
cardholder agreement, Fleet was not so committed, the 
disclosures, as naturally understood, were false, or at least 
misleading. 
 
Had the solicitations actually stated the offered card 
would have "no annual fee ever," then Fleet would have 
violated the TILA, assuming the underlying agreement 
permitted Fleet to impose such a fee in the future. That 
statement would have been false--at the time it was made 
--about the legal obligations of the parties contemplated by 
the then-relevant agreement. Similarly, had the disclosure 
said, "no annual fee subject to change at any time, 
including in the first year," then the disclosure would be 
perfectly accurate for these purposes. The question is, how 
should the statement "no annual fee" be interpreted with 
respect to its duration? 
 
The District Court implicitly understood the statement 
"no annual fee" as implying no duration at all. For only in 
light of such an understanding would the District Court be 
correct in concluding, "Fleet's disclosures in late 1999 were 
accurate with respect to the terms offered at that time." 
Rossman, 2000 WL 33119419, at *3 (emphasis removed).8 
 
Because the TILA is a consumer protection act designed 
to provide easily-understood information to ordinary 
consumers, it is appropriate to make this determination 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The District Court did not discuss this issue, so it is unclear how it 
reached this understanding. It may have done so on the basis of the 
Official Staff Interpretations' instructions that"disclosures should 
reflect 
the credit terms to which the parties are legally bound at the time of 
giving of the disclosures." 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, cmt. 5(c)(1). The 
legal standard for what is required, however, cannot provide a basis for 
determining what the disclosures actually mean. The challenge here is 
not to what Fleet was required to disclose, but what it actually did 
disclose. 
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from the point of view of the consumer.9  We need not 
determine whether Rossman is correct that the disclosure 
implied a permanent promise to refrain from imposing an 
annual fee. For we believe a reasonable consumer would, at 
any rate, be entitled to assume upon reading Fleet's 
solicitation that the issuer was committed to refraining 
from imposing an annual fee for at least one year. The 
statement "no annual fee," in other words, is fairly 
understood to contain an implied term of a year. If Fleet 
had imposed an "annual fee" of twenty dollars upon the 
opening of Rossman's account, she would have been 
entitled to expect that, upon payment of that fee, she would 
be entitled to a year's use of the card, assuming her other 
obligations were met. Thus, had Fleet imposed another 
"annual fee" of thirty-five dollars mid-year, she would 
surely have been deceived. The original twenty-dollar fee 
would then not be an annual fee, but simply a fee. 
Similarly, a reasonable consumer could understand the 
statement "no annual fee" as describing a promise of (at 
least) a fee-free year. It would follow that Rossman's credit 
card was not a no-annual-fee card unless no such fee 
would be charged for a year. Consequently, Fleet's 
statement to the contrary would be false or misleading for 
purposes of the TILA. 
 
In any event, the statement "no annual fee" is not a clear 
and conspicuous disclosure of a set of contract terms that 
permit the imposition of an annual fee within a year. 
Interpreting the statement with an implied annual term is 
at least as natural as interpreting it with no such term, so 
the statement is ambiguous at best. And because the TILA, 
which "should be construed liberally in favor of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We have stated the requirement that disclosures be "reasonably 
understandable" does not require that they be understandable by the 
average consumer. Instead, we have said disclosures must be reasonably 
understandable "in light of the inherent difficulty or complexity of the" 
information disclosed. Applebaum, 226 F.3d at 220. The appropriate 
level of difficulty of understanding the disclosure is not an issue here. 
Instead, the inquiry is into what the disclosures are fairly understood to 
mean, a question not at issue in Applebaum. In any event, there is 
nothing complex about annual fees, so the intended audience is the 
ordinary consumer. 
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consumer," Ramadan, 156 F.3d at 502, is intended to 
provide clear information to consumers, such ambiguities 
should be resolved in favor of the consumer. A clear and 
conspicuous statement of Fleet's authority to change the 
term at any time would, of course, correct this problem. 
 
Fleet contends such a statement is unnecessary, because 
the change-in-terms provision of the agreement is not 
among the terms that must be disclosed under the TILA. 
The issue here, however, is not Fleet's obligation to disclose 
the change-in-terms provision, but its obligation to disclose 
annual fees. And because the statement "no annual fee" 
was misleading with respect to the duration of the offer, 
further clarification was necessary for it to meet the 
requirements of the TILA, assuming the terms of the 
cardholder agreement actually permitted Fleet to dispense 
with its no-annual-fee promise mid-year.10  
 
This reasoning might, of course, apply as well to the 
contractual term promising "no annual fee." Rossman has 
also stated a claim for breach of contract. If the contract 
itself included such a promise, then the contract might 
have been breached, but the disclosure statement would 
presumably be accurate. The disclosure would not, 
therefore, violate the TILA. The contractual question is not, 
however, before us and Fleet has taken the position that it 
was contractually permitted to impose the fee at any time. 
Therefore, we assume, at this juncture, that the contract 
did permit Fleet to impose the fee. Under this assumption, 
a disclosure that implied that Fleet was committed to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Fleet's statement on the solicitation disclosure insert that it 
"reserve[d] the right to change the benefit features associated with your 
Card at any time" did not clearly and conspicuously clarify the annual- 
fee term. It was located outside the Schumer Box, on a line with a 
statement about "Platinum services." The solicitation also included a 
"cardmember benefit list," which included such items as a "Free-Year- 
End Account Summary," "Free Rental Car Insurance," and the like. Not 
included were basic terms such as the APR or fees. Thus, the term 
"benefit" may reasonably be understood to only include these "extras," 
and not such features as a lack of an annual fee. Hence, the statement 
fails to clearly and conspicuously alert the consumer to the fact that the 
"no-annual-fee" feature could be changed at any time, including within 
the first year. 
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refrain from imposing periodic fees for a year would be 
inaccurate for purposes of the TILA. It would be inaccurate 
--at the time of the disclosure--with respect to the legal 
obligations of the parties at that time. 
 
If the cardholder agreement did prohibit the imposition of 
periodic fees for a least a year, then the facts of this case 
would be like those presented in DeMando v. Morris, 206 
F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 2000). There, the credit card issuer 
originally offered a permanent, fixed rate of 10.9%. The 
issuer sought to raise the rate under the change-in-terms 
clause in the applicable agreement. By the time the case 
reached the Court of Appeals, the card issuer admitted the 
attempt to raise the rate violated the terms of the 
agreement, insofar as it promised a permanent fixed rate. 
Under those facts, the original disclosures, which promised 
a fixed rate, accurately reflected the terms of the underlying 
agreement at the time they were made. Id. at 1302-03. 
 
The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that the notice 
announcing the change of rates violated the TILA, as it 
disclosed a rate not permitted under the agreement. Id. at 
1303. Rossman has not claimed the change-in-terms letter 
itself violated the TILA. Consequently, her TILA claim will 
survive only if the agreement permitted Fleet to impose the 
fee, for if it did not, then the original disclosure would have 
accurately reflected the agreement so understood. 
 
In sum, because Fleet maintains--and for present 
purposes we assume--that it had the authority under the 
cardholder agreement to impose an "annual fee" at any 
time, the solicitation disclosures, which promised a"no- 
annual-fee" credit card, did not clearly, conspicuously, and 
accurately reflect the truth of the matter. A final 
determination of whether the statement was false or 
misleading for purposes of the TILA, therefore, will turn on 
an assessment of the portion of the underlying agreement 
the statement purports to disclose. If the agreement does 
not permit modification of an annual fee terms before the 
completion of the first annual term, the statement"no 
annual fee" is, as far as this analysis goes, an adequate 
disclosure. If the agreement did permit such a modification, 
however, then the disclosure falls short. 
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c. Bait-and-Switch Allegations. 
 
Rossman challenges the District Court's dismissal of her 
TILA claim on the basis of her assertion that Fleet here 
engaged in a "bait and switch" scheme. Rossman alleges-- 
and we must assume the truth of these allegations for 
purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion--that Fleet solicited her 
business with the no-annual-fee offer while intending to 
change the terms shortly thereafter. Rejecting this claim, 
the District Court held that the legality of such schemes is 
outside the TILA's narrow focus on disclosure. 
 
The Federal Trade Commission treats advertising in bait- 
and-switch schemes as false or misleading. 16 C.F.R.S 238 
("Guides Against Bait Advertising "). Regulation Z also 
addresses these schemes.11 See 12 C.F.R. S 226.16(a) ("If an 
advertisement for credit states specific credit terms, it shall 
state only those terms that actually are or will be arranged 
or offered by the creditor."); Ralph J. Rohner & Fred H. 
Miller, Truth in Lending 752 (2000) ("This rule is aimed at 
the ancient but dishonorable practice of `bait and switch' 
advertising where the creditor uses the lure of attractive 
credit terms to induce customers in, but no such favorable 
terms are in fact available."). Bait advertising, although not 
necessarily literally false (there is usually a real item 
described in the advertising), is nonetheless considered 
deceptive, insofar as it suggests the product advertised is 
actually offered and intended to be sold, when the real 
intention is simply to create a contact with the buyer that 
allows the seller to switch the consumer to a more 
profitable sale. It is the bait, not the switch, that is 
deceptive. Hence, the deception occurs at the time of the 
bait advertisement. Rossman contends Fleet's solicitations 
contained a deception of this kind, which negates its claim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Regulation Z also provides, "The disclosures given in accordance with 
S 226.5a do not constitute advertising terms for purposes of the 
requirements of this section." 12 C.F.R. S 226.16(b) n.36d. Therefore, at 
least much of the information contained in the solicitations may not fall 
under this rule. Furthermore, the Act does not expressly provide for a 
private cause of action for violations of the advertising requirements, so 
it is not clear that Rossman could raise such a claim. See 15 U.S.C. 
S 1640(a). In any event, Rossman has not alleged a violation of section 
226.16. 
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that the disclosures were accurate at the time they were 
made. 
 
Citing Clark v. Troy & Nichols, Inc., 864 F.2d 1261 (5th 
Cir. 1989), the District Court rejected plaintiff 's position. 
Defendant Troy & Nichols offered to obtain a mortgage for 
plaintiff Clark on certain terms and the parties entered into 
an agreement to that effect. Clark was then offered a 
substantially less advantageous set of terms. Clark refused 
and the credit arrangement was never consummated. 
 
While accepting that Clark had properly characterized 
defendants' actions as a bait-and-switch scheme, the Fifth 
Circuit explicitly rejected bait-and-switch actions under the 
TILA: "The Truth in Lending Act does not provide a cause 
of action when a lender engages in `bait and switch' 
techniques. It does require that the lender make certain 
disclosures with respect to the offered terms." Id. at 1264. 
Under this view, the creditor's intention not to offer the 
originally stated terms is irrelevant to the analysis. So long 
as the disclosures reflect the stated terms of an agreement, 
they are accurate under the TILA. And since, in Clark, the 
terms ultimately agreed to were disclosed before the 
consummation of the loan there at issue, the requirements 
of the TILA were met. Cf. Janikowski v. Lynch Ford, Inc., 
210 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that"spot 
delivery" schemes, identical in relevant respects to bait- 
and-switch schemes, do not violate the TILA). 
 
The District Court here adopted this approach, stating, 
"Fleet's disclosures in late 1999 were accurate with respect 
to the terms offered at that time; the fact that Fleet allegedly 
intended to change those terms in the near further did not 
render the disclosures inaccurate for purposes of the TILA." 
Rossman, 2000 WL 33119419, at *3. 
 
In one sense, the solicitation disclosures here were 
accurate--the agreement then referred to by the disclosures 
did not contemplate an annual fee. But in another sense, if 
Fleet intended to impose an annual fee shortly thereafter, 
the disclosures were at least misleading. A reasonable 
consumer would expect that, even if the terms may change, 
the stated terms are those that the card issuer intends to 
provide. The disclosures--we assume for these purposes-- 
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feigned an intention to provide credit under a set of terms 
that Fleet did not intend to provide over time. Thus, even if 
the language of the disclosures did not imply that Fleet was 
obligated for at least a year, the disclosures were 
misleading with respect to Fleet's alleged intentions. As the 
dissent in Clark noted, such a deception may, in some 
ways, be worse than simply inaccurate disclosures: 
 
        The majority concludes that even though the lender 
       never intended to extend credit on the terms disclosed, 
       the accuracy of the disclosures remain untainted. In 
       my view, an intention from the outset not to extend 
       credit on disclosed terms is far more egregious than 
       inaccurate terms. On careful review of the disclosures, 
       one might detect an inconsistency between the interest 
       rate promised and the amortization schedule disclosed. 
       By contrast, there is no way to enter the lender's mind 
       to determine whether he means what he discloses. 
 
        Disclosures feigning one's true intention, in my view, 
       are inaccurate. 
 
864 F.2d at 1266 (Thornberry, J., dissenting). 
 
Because the TILA is to be construed strictly against the 
creditor, Ramadan, 156 F.3d at 502, it is at least debatable 
that the dissent had the better understanding of the 
accuracy required by the TILA. We need not enter that 
particular debate, however, because we believe, in any 
event, this case is distinguishable from Clark . 
 
Clark was a classic bait-and-switch case. The plaintiff 
there was first attracted by a deceptive offer. Having 
obtained his audience, the lender attempted to switch the 
offer to a set of terms more favorable to itself and less 
favorable to the borrower. All of this occurred before the 
consummation of an agreement. Clark was able to, and 
chose to, refuse the switch based on accurate disclosures. 
He was never a party to a credit agreement whose terms 
were not adequately disclosed. 
 
The disclosures at issue in Clark were initial disclosures 
--disclosures that must be made by a specified time before 
the consummation of the agreement. With respect to the 
terms actually offered, disclosure was achieved by the 
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second disclosure statement. The first statement did not 
accurately reflect the terms of the agreement ultimately 
offered, but the second statement provided Clark with fully 
adequate disclosure before an agreement was reached, 
providing Clark with the opportunity to accept or decline 
the proposed agreement on the basis of full information. 
Armed with that information, he chose not to enter into an 
agreement. 
 
Here, by contrast, the original disclosures were not 
corrected before Rossman entered into the agreement. 
These disclosures remained the relevant disclosures of the 
agreement ultimately reached. But it is essential to the 
TILA's purposes that consumers be informed of the basic 
conditions of credit before they enter a credit relationship. 
As the second disclosures in Clark did provide adequate 
information before consummation, these concerns were not 
implicated there. 
 
This bait-and-switch case, therefore, goes beyond 
standard bait-and-switch cases such as Clark. The switch 
here did not occur as the result of a sales tactic before the 
formation of the contract, but by invoking an undisclosed 
term in an existing contract. Rossman entered the 
agreement without the benefit of disclosure of what she 
alleges was Fleet's intended annual fee. To the extent the 
original disclosures were corrected by the notice of change, 
this correction happened only after Rossman had used, and 
been bound by, the agreement for several months. Had 
Rossman received the notice of the change in the form of an 
initial notice before opening her account, she would have 
been subject to a classic bait-and-switch analogous to 
Clark, and would have found herself in a correspondingly 
less disadvantageous position. 
 
Significantly, it would appear that Rossman was not 
entirely free, following notice of the pending imposition of 
the annual fee, to walk away from her credit arrangement 
in the same way that Clark was upon receiving his second 
set of disclosures. Credit card holders may have balances 
they are unable to pay off within a month. And if Rossman 
did attempt to cancel the card while carrying a balance, 
Fleet retained the contractual authority to assess a 24.99% 
APR on the remaining balance. Therefore, there may have 
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been no way to avoid incurring the obligation to pay the 
annual fee under the changed contract. As such, the notice 
of change was correspondingly less valuable than initial 
disclosure of the annual fee would have been. 
 
Furthermore, Congress has imposed special requirements 
on credit card solicitations that did not apply to the 
mortgage in Clark. Not only must issuers disclose the basic 
terms of the agreement prior to consummation ("initial 
disclosures"), they must additionally12 disclose--clearly, 
conspicuously, and accurately--many of those terms in the 
solicitation itself ("solicitation disclosures" or "early 
disclosures").13 These requirements are unique to credit and 
charge cards.14 They seek to ensure that consumers have 
the information needed to make informed choices with 
respect to credit cards not only before the agreement is 
consummated, but also at the (generally earlier) point at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. While distinct requirements apply to solicitation disclosures, and to 
initial disclosures, the credit card issuer may fulfil both requirements 
with the same instrument: 
 
       Combining disclosures. The initial disclosures required by S 226.6 
do 
       not substitute for the disclosures required by S 226.5a; however, a 
       card issuer may establish procedures so that a single disclosure 
       statement meets the requirements of both sections. For example, if 
       a card issuer in complying with S 226.5a(e)(2) provides all the 
       applicable disclosures required under S 226.6, in a form that the 
       consumer may keep and in accordance with the other format and 
       timing requirements for that section, the issuer satisfies the 
initial 
       disclosure requirements under S 226.6 as well as the disclosure 
       requirements of S 226.5a(e)(2). 
 
12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, cmt. 5a-2. 
 
13. We recognize that the TILA contains a kind of early disclosure 
requirement for mortgages, like the one at issue in Clark. 16 U.S.C. 
S 1638(b)(2) (requiring disclosures "not later than three business days 
after the creditor receives the consumer's written application"). That 
provision, however, simply changes the timing of the initial disclosures. 
It is not an additional requirement, as is the credit card solicitation 
disclosure requirement. 
 
14. Because credit card rates did not decline along with other interest 
rates during the 1980s, and were among the most profitable loans 
during that period, Congress singled out credit cards for special 
treatment. See S. Rep. 100-259, at 2, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3937. 
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which they are considering responding to an issuer's 
solicitation. 
 
Under the approach urged by Fleet, a credit issuer would 
be able to disclose any terms it wanted to, with no intention 
ultimately to offer those terms. It could send, together with 
the card, a new set of disclosures stating the terms it had 
always actually intended to provide. Fleet's approach would 
have the potential to render the solicitation disclosure 
requirements created by the 1988 amendments to the TILA 
entirely ineffectual. Misleading early disclosures would 
serve no informative purpose. And worse, the additional 
disclosure requirement mandated by Congress--for the 
purpose of encouraging informed consumer choices--could 
be used for the purpose of deceiving consumers. 
 
The Federal Reserve Board has determined that when a 
credit card issuer offers rates or fees that are reduced or 
waived for a limited period of time, the issuer must disclose 
the applicable rate or fee that will apply indefinitely, and is 
permitted to disclose introductory rates only if the period of 
time in which the rate or fee is applicable is also disclosed. 
12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, cmt. 5a(b)(1)-5 (introductory 
rates); cmt. 5a(b)(2)-4 (waived or reduced fees). 15 Thus, as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. These comments, in full, read as follows: 
 
       Introductory rates--discounted rates. If the initial rate is 
temporary 
       and is lower than the rate that will apply after the temporary rate 
       expires, the card issuer must disclose the annual percentage rate 
       that would otherwise apply to the account. In a fixed-rate account, 
       the card issuer must disclose the rate that will apply after the 
       introductory rate expires. In a variable-rate account, the card 
issuer 
       must disclose a rate based on the index or formula applicable to 
the 
       account in accordance with the rules in S 226.5a(b)(1)(ii) and 
       comment 5a(b)(1)-3. An initial discounted rate may be provided in 
       the table along with the rate required to be disclosed if the card 
       issuer also discloses the time period during which the introductory 
       rate will remain in effect. 
 
       Waived or reduced fees. If fees required to be disclosed are waived 
       or reduced for a limited time, the introductory fees or the fact of 
fee 
       waivers may be provided in the table in addition to the required 
fees 
       if the card issuer also discloses how long the fees or waivers will 
       remain in effect. 
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general matter, credit card issuers are required to disclose 
fees whose imposition will be delayed for a given period of 
time, such as the annual fee at issue here. 
 
Fleet is apparently of the view that the card issuer's 
obligation, under this provision, to disclose the temporary 
nature of the fee in advance arises only when the 
cardholder agreement, which is ordinarily provided later, 
will include mention of the fee. Such a rule, however, would 
permit issuers to readily circumvent the requirement. The 
common practice of offering cards with low "teaser" rates 
would effectively be rendered immune from disclosure 
requirements. From the point of view of the consumer, 
there is no substantive difference between a card that had 
a low "fixed" rate that the issuer secretly intends to 
increase six months later, and a card with a low temporary 
rate that will similarly increase after half a year. The only 
purported basis for the difference in disclosure 
requirements is language in a document that, in most 
cases, the consumer will not have been provided at the time 
of the disclosures. Solicitation disclosures are intended to 
alert the consumer to the basic costs of the credit card he 
is considering--a purpose unserved where the issuer 
conceals the temporary nature of a favorable fee or rate in 
this manner. 
 
Because so many credit solicitations do include 
introductory rates and fees, it is reasonable to view a 
solicitation that promises fixed rates and no annual fees as 
describing an agreement under which the issuer intends to 
offer those terms until there is a reason to change them. A 
statement, therefore, that a card has "no annual fee" made 
by a creditor that intends to impose such a fee shortly 
thereafter, is misleading. It is an accurate statement only in 
the narrowest of senses--and not in a sense appropriate to 
consumer protection disclosure statute such as the TILA. 
Fleet's proposed approach would permit the use of required 
disclosures--intended to protect consumers from hidden 
costs--to intentionally deceive customers as to the costs of 
credit. Neither the language of the TILA itself, nor 
Regulation Z or the Official Staff Interpretations directs 
such a result. 
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Rossman has alleged Fleet intentionally and in fact 
misled her and others with its disclosure of a "no-annual- 
fee" credit card. If Rossman's allegations are true--which 
we assume on a motion to dismiss--such misleading 
statements are inaccurate for purposes of the TILA, and 
violate its requirements. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the forgoing reasons, we hold that Rossman has 
stated a claim under the TILA. Accordingly, we will reverse 
the judgment of the District Court, and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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